Relational value chains. When produ

Relational value chains. When product specifications cannot be codified,
transactions are complex, and supplier capabilities are high, relational
value chain governance can be expected. This is because tacit knowledge
must be exchanged between buyers and sellers, and because highly competent
suppliers provide a strong motivation for lead firms to outsource
to gain access to complementary competencies. The mutual dependence
that then arises may be regulated through reputation, social and spatial
proximity, family and ethnic ties, and the like. It can also be handled
through mechanisms that impose costs on the party that breaks a contract,
as discussed in Williamson’s analysis of credible commitments
and hostages (Williamson, 1983). The exchange of complex tacit information
is most often accomplished by frequent face-to-face interaction
and governed by high levels of explicit coordination, which makes the
costs of switching to new partners high.

Results (English) 1:

The relational value chains. When product specifications cannot be codified,transactions are complex, and supplier capabilities are high, the relationalvalue chain governance can be expected. This is because tacit knowledgemust be exchanged between buyers and sellers, and because highly competentsuppliers provide a strong motivation for the lead firms to outsourceto gain access to complementary competencies. The mutual dependencethat then arises may be regulated through reputation, social and spatialproximity, family and ethnic ties, and the like. It can also be handledthrough mechanisms that impose costs on the party that breaks a contract,the U.S. discussed in Williamson's analysis of policy commitmentsand hostages (Williamson, 1983). The exchange of complex, tacit knowledge informationis most often accomplished by the frequent face-to-face interactionand governed by high levels of explicit coordination, which makes thecosts of switching to new partners high.

Results (English) 2:

Relational value chains. When product specifications can not be codified,
transactions are complex, and supplier capabilities are high, relational
value chain governance can be expected. Because this is tacit knowledge
must be exchanged between buyers and sellers, and Because highly competent
suppliers provide a strong motivation for lead firms to outsource
to gain access to complementary competencies. The mutual dependence
that then arises may be regulated through reputation, social and spatial
proximity, family and ethnic ties, and the like. It can also be handled
through mechanisms that impose costs on the party that breaks a contract,
as Discussed in Williamson's analysis of credible commitments
and hostages (Williamson, 1983). The tacit exchange of complex information
is most Often accomplished by frequent face-to-face interaction
and governed by high levels of explicit coordination, the which makes the
costs of switching to new partners high.